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A READING of the Stoic writers for the first time inevitably
-<-~^ suggests certain comparisons and contrasts with the Greek
philosophy from a study of which the subject has been approached.
The student is likely first of all to be impressed with the fact that
Stoicism presents a more comprehensive outlook on life than did
the philosophical schools which preceded it. Here for the first
time is to be found a firmly welded unity with a fourfold aspect
of science, religion, philosophy and ethics. Philosophy is no longer
the reduction of the concrete to the abstract with entire emphasis
on humanism, as we found it in Plato, or a comprehensive system
of interweaving and nicely related scientific departments of knowl-
edge, as in Aristotle, but an outlook on the universe in four direc-
tions, with a new and stern atmosphere of grim fate and renuncia-
tion hanging over it all. This is not, however, to say that each of
these aspects is equally vital. The scientific and philosophical sides
of Stoicism, based entirely on the science and philosophy of the past
by a cunning rearrangement and combination of elements from De-
mocritus, Plato and Aristotle, seem singularly barren when compared
with the living doctrines of the sources. The sound, firm material-
ism of Democritus has become a curious kind of spiritual mechanism.
The world of reality, to be sure, is to the Stoics corporeal ; force and
matter, the active and the passive, mind and body, are correlative
and inseparable, distinguishable from one another in degree and not
in kind. But it is to the first of these pairs that the actual enthusiasm
of the Stoic goes out; he conceives force and soul as material, but
he insists on treating them as if they were spiritual. Soul gets
carried over into a religious sphere in a way that utterly distinguishes
it from mere passive matter. Nor in absorbing Aristotle do they
get the full inspiring force of his teleology. They follow him, it is
true, in making the universe teleological, but they give the idea a
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mystical color and merge it into an adoration of God or the gods,
giving it a religious, or at least ultra-scientific aspect which Aris-
totle would not have accepted.
Not only the science of the Stoics but their metaphysics has a
religious color. The idea of the logos, or immanent reason by which
the universe is governed, which has fitted everything together, good
and evil, into one perfect whole, regulating itself with eternal
fitness and adequacy,—this logos is no cold philosophical principle,
but a religious fact which enlists the emotional attitude of the Stoic.
As an indispensable and vital part of one majestic whole, he ac-
quires a supreme dignity and worth ; he is a part of God. Simi-
larly the thought that every individual soul is a manifestation of a
great world-soul, to be eventually absorbed into it again, has a
religious meaning for the Stoic ; he feels himself, as Epictetus says,
a son of God, as all men on earth are sons of God. Although the
scientific and philosophical principles of Stoicism furnish its funda-
mental basis—indeed the one ultimate fact on which the whole
spirit of the ethics rests is that the world is governed by irreversible
laws and in accordance with reason—science and philosophy become
vital to the Stoic only when they are transmuted into religion. It is
the religious side of Stoicism which captures the enthusiasm and
fires the soul. This attitude is, of course, different from the Greeks'
;
they kept their religion separate. Christianity, on the other hand,
had no scientific content at all. Stoicism is thus a sort of half-way
stage between Greek philosophical-scientific thought and Christian
religious-ethical thought. It drags along with it the Greek science
and philosophy, but the vitality is slowly leaving both. At the same
time it has its face towards the future of Christian thought and
ethics and goes to meet it with joyful steps. Stoicism is at once
the senility of Greek thought and the infancy of Christian faith.
If the religious predominates in Stoicism at the expense of the
philosophical and scientific, we may expect the ethical element in
it to show also a flourishing vitality. And of course this is the
case. In fact so predominant is this ethical aspect of Stoicism that
it almost in fact and quite completely in tradition obscures even the
religious. Yet they are bound up inseparably together. There can
be ethics without religion, but can there be such an ethics without
religion? I cannot conceive of such an ethics as that of Stoicism
being practiced by human beings except warmed and vitalized by
that emotional attitude towards the universe which we call religion.
The ethics of Stoicism is an ethics of conformity to nature.
Although God is benevolent and all-wise, his plans and reason are
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not to be pettily used for the individual's advantag^e. The respon-
sibility for the happiness, well-being, and integrity of soul of the
individual are strictly upon himself. It behooves him. therefore, to
recognize both his powers and his limitations. Opinion, pursuit,
desire and aversion are within a man's power; in these spheres he
is absolutely free. Body, property, reputation are not ; he is, from
the nature of things, helpless before them. If a man desires or en-
joys only those things that are in his ])Ower, he can never be un-
hap])y ; for he can never be (le])rived of them. If he ceases to desire
or fear or shun those things which are not in his power, he can be
nothing but hap])y. for he will never suffer disappointment. Free-
dom is not requiring things to happen as you wish, but wishing them
to happen as they do. Knowledge is knowledge of the will of God
and obedience to it. The virtuous man cannot be affected by poverty,
pain, bereavement, misfortune, insults, pleasures, or any evil, for he
has no feelings of either desire or aversion for these things. He is
independent because he wishes nothing that depends on others. He
is happy because he is acting in accordance with the Universal Rea-
son. He knows that nothing can happen which is not conformable
to the order of the universe. He knows that "what e'er betide, he
is the Captain of his Soul."
A reading of the Stoic writers, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus
Aurelius gives one a sort of composite picture of the ethics through
the medium of three contrasting temperaments. Epictetus has the
true philosophical spirit, a poise, a placidness, a grave irony, that
rings true. Even if one knew nothing about his history, one could
say, "Here is a philosophy that has been lived, that has worked with
one man at least ; whose words and practice have been identical,
and are still vital with sincerity." ,If one allows himself at times
a little appreciation of the ingenuity with which he works out his
ethical ideas, this does not destroy in one the profound sense of the
power and force of such a philosophy for men in all ages and
climes, situated as was Epictetus. or a realization of the happiness
which he achieved. Epictetus is a living philosophy, a gospel in-
carnate, a missionary of a way of life for men.
Seneca, while delightful in style and form, has a curious atti-
tude of detachment from his writings. Stoicism to him is a good
philosophy, he is earnestly trying to follow it, he understands it
and expounds it luminously ; but it is not precisely his way of life.
Not only his ideas but his treatment of them are strikingly like
the ethics of modern Christianity. I have heard many a sermon
which followed word for word his discourse on "Providence." Where
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Epictetus pictures Stoicism in all its sternness, even though it be
a tonic sternness, a fortifying and ennobling strength,—Seneca
dwells rather on the compensatory and comforting aspects. Trial
and pain are not simply matters of utter indifference ; they are
tests of valor, means perhaps to an end. The virtuous life is happy,
not so much on account of the attainment of the desired apathy,
but because virtue has some sort of positive quality about it. If
the rigid outlines .of Stoicism sometimes get softened down in
Seneca to a suggestion of the utilitarian, he has yet succeeded in
making the Stoical ethics attractive in a greater measure than either
of the other writers.
Far different is the gloom which pervades the "Meditations"
of Marcus Aurelius. The ancient world, which had begun to de-
cline in the days of Epictetus, to which decline Stoicism may be
said to have been a philosophical reaction,—this world had become
sunk in almost irretrievable decay. Had Marcus Aurelius been
slave instead of emperor, Stoicism might have enriched and vitalized
his life, as it did that of Epictetus. It is a philosophy which puts
heart and meaning into misery and oppressive environment. But to
Marcus /\urelius at the head of the world, lacking nothing of mate-
rial wealth, honor and fortune, it only revealed the hopeless futility
of life. He saw that society was utterly decayed ; he did not have
misfortune and evil conditions to contend against, or a struggle
with environment into which he could, like Epictetus, pour whole-
heartedly his spiritual energy. His Stoicism revealed nothing to him
except that overpowering sense of the vanity of life which hangs
like a pall of horror over his writings. I have seen Christians of
to-day of the Tolstoyan type who feel keenly the social misery
around them, who struggle to remedy it, fail and in despair see
nothing that they can do except to mellow their spirits and trust
in the ultimate divine justice. This, I imagine, was Marcus Aure-
lius's cast of mind. Stoicism helped him to endure, but it shed no
ray of light into the gloom ; it rather intensified the darkness. Every
thoughtful man gets at some period or other of his life a sense of
the futility of living ; but it is the sustained feeling and constant
impression of having run into a cul-de-sac that makes Marcus
Aurelius such appalling reading. It is a far cry from the richness
of Epictetus to the sterility of Marcus Aurelius.
The contrast between the three men in religious tone is equally
striking. Epictetus has the grave, responsible feeling of partner-
ship, a sturdy working together with God ; Seneca shows that rather
complacent attitude which characterizes many of our modern theo-
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logians, a sort of good, amicable understanding with the universe;
Marcus Aurelius's cry is that of the wounded Job,—"Though he
slay me, yet will I trust in him !"
This markedly religious element in Stoicism furnishes, I think,
the clue for its relation to Christianity. That there is such an in-
dissoluble relation between them is of course almost a platitude.
But the similarities between Stoicism and Christianity which appear
to the theologian as curious coincidences are really evidences that
Christianity found in Stoicism the fruitful soil from which alone it
could spring and bloom. I do not see how Christianity could have
converted any but a Stoic world. Instead of coming as a fulfilment
of the Law and the Prophets, it can be said rather to have come as
a fulfilment of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. It filled out the
religious content of Stoicism, which bade fair to wither in the barren
soil of Pantheism ; it revitalized its virtues and added hope to its
rugged strength. It made the God of benevolence and Immanent
Reason, a divine Father, who cared for each one of his children ; it
made the vague hope of immortality a triumphant certainty ; it made
suffering and submission to the will of God, the basis of Eternal
Life ; it made the tranquil peace of the virtuous man over into the
saintliness of the redeemed ; it made of the conviction that a man
was a part of the universe, the overpowering sense of communion
with Christ; it.made over the Stoic's contempt of the world and its
pleasures into a complete and triumphant other-worldliness, in which
the Unseen was the only Reality ; and, finally, it added belief, the
fierce clinging of the soul to a dogma, the spiritual and intellectual
sense of being planted on a rock, that Stoicism had so sadly lacked.
Christianity transfigured Stoicism, poetized it, completed the spirit-
ualization of it, and with it swept the western world. Christianity
was in a sense an easier religion than Stoicism. The latter was
quite too hard for the mass of men ; only the sage and philosophic
few could attain virtue under it. Christianized, however, it became
possible for every one, and with the cunning progress of the church,
it became irresistible. The way in which the church adapted Chris-
tianity to the people, adding touches here, filling up niches there,
warping and molding it until every part of the soul of man was
soothed and satisfied, must in detailed study, I think, form one of
the most fascinating fields of research. Little as the result of this
process, the medieval church, resembles the Stoicism of Marcus
Aurelius, the body and blood of it was that very Stoicism. Chrisianity
was the vital breath that was breathed into its dying body and with
it conquered the world. Else I do not see how the phenomenon can
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be explained. Surely nothing sounds more incredible than that a
religion of other-worldliness, of asceticism and sacrifice, with the
cross, that sign of the lowest dishonor as its symbol, should over-
come the decaying, despairing, vicious Roman world. Yet exactly
that happened. Only when we realize that the noblest spirits of the
time felt a soul-sickness in the irretrievable degeneration going on
about them, that their hearts ached for rest, for satisfaction, for some
world of reality away from this frightful chaos, that while Stoicism
offered them a partial respite and consolation, it lacked definiteness,
hope and sensuousness, and that Christianity supplied all these,
—
only when we realize this can we understand how it was possible
for the cross to triumph. The world was sick for redemption
;
Stoicism could solace but it could not redeem.
This Stoic element Christianity has borne along within her
fabric down through the centuries. In times of crisis or critical
change, when dogmas lose their grip and the supernatural becomes
misty before our eyes, the bare, rugged outlines of Stoicism stand
out in our midst. Much of the ethical preaching of to-day is pure
Stoicism. Resignation to our lot ; realization of our responsibility
and dignity in the sight of God ; the imperative of duty as meas-
ured by our relations to others
;
governance of the spirit, and
struggle against besetting sins ; the vanity of life and a need for a
decent preparedness for death ; realization that suffering and mis-
fortune are indispensable means to goodness, and that all is finally
safe in God's hands,—all this is Stoic. It may be said that all this
is Christian too ; but in Christianity it is incidental to a more glori-
ous, transcendental fact, while in Stoicism it is the very root and
branch.
If it was into Christianity that Stoicism led. it was out of Greek
ethics that it came. The time between the death of Aristotle and the
height of the Stoic school is a time of slow decay in Greece. The
ethics of Plato and Aristotle were formulated in a society in which
there were potentialities for the realization of their ideals. But with
the passing glory of Greece, with increasing political chaos and de-
cline of material prosperity, with insecurity of fortune and social
instability, any realization of the Greek ideal, that is, the harmonious
development of the tendencies and powers of the individual through
the medium of a well-ordered state, became absolutely impossible.
Men turned to an ethical philosophy that had at least some poten-
tiality of realization in it. Epicureanism was a sort of last stand
of the Greek spirit, but with Lucretius it comes to be hardly differen-
tiated from Stoicism in actual ethical tone. The latter with its
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message of solace for a defeated world completely replaced the old
ethics. It is pathetic to think of an ethics of intelligent cultivation
of the finest spiritual and material resources of the world, their
rational, scientific utilization and mastery, in a world of social virtue
and cooperation and mutuality,—of such an ethics being superseded
by an intensely narrow, individualistic, renunciatory system such
as Stoicism. It seems like a sort of spiritual suicide that the thought
of the time committed. It was certainly an amputation, a mutila-
tion, and all for the sake of a negative thing like tranquillity ! And
\et the goal of Greek ethics, although its emphasis was on the
dynamic, was also a satisfying happiness. It was the positive aspect
of the same thing that the Stoic labored, though so negatively, to
acquire. The difference, however, was as wide as the poles. For
the Greek moved in harmony with the vital forces of Nature, but
the Stoic cut across her grain at every point. Yet our topsy-turvy
notions ascribe a higher nobility to Stoicism than to the Greek
ethics ! On the assumption, doubtless, that the more hopeless and
corrupt and unspiritual the age, the more beautiful and pure and
noble will be their ethical philosophy, while an age of beauty and
happiness and knowledge and power and spiritual values of the
highest import must perforce possess a sordid, mean and material
ethics? If we say we feel instinctively that the Christian-Stoical
ethics is nobler than the Greek ideal, it is because we have lived
so long and so submissively in an ugly, deformed world of social
misery and maladjustment that we have lost our sense of true ethical
values. The only world worth living in,—it cannot be too often
reiterated,—is a Greek world, or a world which people with you
are trying to make Greek ; and this fact should be the basis of all
our teaching, our preaching, our talking, our writing and our work-
ing.
It will be said that this is all very well, but that even the best
of Greek worlds will deal the individual, at some time or other,
terrific blows of misfortune. For the individual, and at such
times, Stoicism is surely legitimate and indeed indispensable. Every
man is a Stoic at some crisis of his life. There is a fierce satis-
faction in feeling that whatever may happen, one's own soul can-
not be shattered ; that a man has something which no power in
heaven and earth can deprive him of; that with it he can face fear-
lessly the whole universe, and no real harm can happen to him.
The Stoical doctrine, however, sounds better than it works. The
Stoical spirit at its best can be but a temporary thing. It is a
splendid thing to be ke])t on hand for emergencies. But as a way
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of life it falls pitiably short of the Greek ideal. It is in its last
analysis but a way of making the best of a bad bargain ; it is a
"sour-grapes" philosophy, and however much we may admire the
wisdom and submissiveness of the renunciator, we must admit that
there is something still better and that is to have gotten the grapes
themselves. I may accede to poverty (since I must), but I will not
insult the integrity of my soul by saying that it is right. The Stoic
would. Or rather perhaps he would remove the whole question to
the apathetic plane, and say that he is entirely indifferent to both
poverty and well-doing, and can say nothing about the rightness
and wrongness at all. I do not charge the Stoic, as do some, with
subscribing to fatalism, or of investing himself with spiritual pride.
But I do accuse him of evading the question that Greek ethics puts
with such beautiful clearness, "What is the happiness of man, con-
stituted as he is?" and I accuse him of being a foe to progress. The
Greek ideal is dynamic ; it pushes men forward to a definite goal
which in the best moments of the race they have clearly seen to be
the desirable one. But Stoicism is purely static and passive ; the
Stoic endures, he does not pioneer. To the Greek mind, man in
the mechanism of the world is the tender, the guider of the ma-
chine ; to the Stoic, he is the helpless product, or at best an infini-
tesimal cog or screw. The Greek ideal may be delusion, and the
Stoic the divinely ordained road to the skies. If so, is it not strange
that all that is finest in mankind has called imperatively, insistently
through all the ages for the realization of the former ideal ? Only
when the crushing force of environment has sapped his hope, only
when the odds of fate seem hopeless against him, only in defeat
does man turn to Stoicism. Here he may find strength sufficient for
the day, but not renewed vigor for the battle. Stoicism in its last
analysis is an ethics of weakness and decline and deficit, and not of
strength and constructive power.
